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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ill-effects of stigmatization and the needless loss of valuable skills to the
country.
WILLIAM B. CRUMPLER
Admiralty-Dockside Injuries under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
In Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson1 three longshoremen had been
attaching cargo from railroad cars located on piers to ships' cranes for
loading onto the vessels. One longshoreman had been killed when cargo
hoisted by a crane knocked him to the pier or crushed him against the
side of the railroad car. The other two had been injured in the same
accident.
Deputy Commissioners of the United States Department of Labor
denied claims for compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act2 in each case on the ground that the in-
juries had not occurred "upon the navigable waters of the United States,"
as required by the statute. The federal trial courts upheld the com-
missioners' decisions.3 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting4 reversed. The Supreme Court
on certiorari reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act did not cover longshore-
men injured on docks, piers, or bridges. The basic reasons for the
Court's denial of coverage to the longshoremen in Nacirema is best
explained by the historical development of state and federal jurisdiction
over maritime workers.
Although inadequate common-law remedies for injured workers led
to the adoption of state workmen's compensation statutes following the
industrial revolution,5 there was no corresponding federal development
1396 U.S. 212 (1969).
233 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
'Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965);
Traynor v. Johnson, 245 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1965).
' 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).
'The statutes of Washington, Iowa, and New York were constitutionally
sustained in aspects not concerning the extent of their coverage. Mountain Timber
Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210
(1917); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). See G. GILmOra
& C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 3,37 (1957).
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in admiralty." Moreover, an attempt to extend state workmen's com-
pensation to borderline maritime cases was struck down in 1917 by the
Supreme Court in South Pacific Co. v. Jensen.7 In Jensen a longshore-
man was killed while operating a truck on a gangway connecting a vessel
with a pier. After New York permitted recovery under its compensation
statute, the Supreme Court reversed and held that both the situs of the
accident and the nature of the work being performed were maritime and
that any attempt to apply a state act to such facts was an unconstitutional
interference with the uniformity of federal maritime law. Congress
attempted twice to circumvent the ruling in Jensen by legislation autho-
rizing state compensation acts to cover such cases," but both efforts were
declared unconstitutional. In Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co.'0
the Court suggested that Congress enact national legislation covering
maritime workers whom the state could not constitutionally protect.'1
Meanwhile, the Court, possibly realizing the harshness of a strict
application of Jensen, began to make exceptions to the rule. The maritime-
but-local exception was created in Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia.'" The
Court held that state workmen's compensation and wrongful death acts
could validly apply to maritime activities that were of "local," as opposed
to "national," concern. The reasoning was that application of state law
in such cases would "not work material prejudice to the characteristic
features of the general maritime law, nor interfere with the proper
harmony and uniformity of that law as to international and interstate
relations."' 13 Unfortunately, what constitutes a maritime-but-local excep-
tion is often unclear.
The second important exception to the rule in Jensen was developed
The United States Constitution places admiralty and maritime matters in the
original federal jurisdiction. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
" 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
'Act of Oct. 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 395; Act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat. 634.
' Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v.
W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).10264 U.S. 219 (1924).
" Id. at 227. The Court stated:
Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise the maritime
law by statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment.
This power, we think, would permit enactment of a general Employees' Law
of general provisions for compensating injured employees, but it may not be
delegated to the several states.
12257 U.S. 233 (1921).10Id. at 242. The Court allowed coverage of a longshoreman working on an
incomplete vessel in navigable waters because of the "local" nature of his work.
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in Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corp.14 and confirmed by subse-
quent decisions. 5 In this line of cases, the Court emphasized that state
workmen's compensation laws were applicable to injuries occurring on
docks, piers, and similar structures permanently affixed to the shore and
extending over navigable waters because they are considered extensions of
the land. The Court reasoned that since admiralty jurisdiction for torts
does not encompass injuries occurring on land or its extensions,", workers
injured on docks and piers could legitimately be covered by state com-
pensation statutes. Hence, while a longshoreman was within the broader
maritime jurisdiction for contracts by virtue of the status of his employ-
ment, he came within the domain of state law if the injury occurred upon
the land or an extension of the landY' Consequently, the cumulative effect
of the two exceptions declared in Garcia and Nordenholt was to allow
coverage under state workmen's compensation statutes if the injury
occurred on a dock, pier, or similar structure permanently affixed to the
land or, if the matter was sufficiently "local," on navigable waters.
In 1927, in answer to the Court's earlier suggestion, Congress passed
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act to provide
a recovery under federal law for injured maritime workers. The Act
provided compensation
in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability
or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters
of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for
the disability or death through workman's compensation mnay not be
provided by State law.'8
Seemingly there are two prerequisites for an award under the Act: (1)
that the injury occur upon the navigable waters of the United States and
(2) that no compensation can be paid under state law;v. The interpreta-
tion of f- iese two provisions has since been the subject of extensive
litigation. 9
14259 U.S. 263 (1922).15See, e.g., Swanson v. -Manor Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946) ; T. Smith & Son v.
Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928)..
"See Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 U.S. 316
(1908).
1The vature of the contract determines maritime jurisdiction over contracts,
but it is the sitits of the tort that is the test for maritime jurisdiction. See In-
dustrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt, 259 U.S. 263 (1922).
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964) (emphasis added).See, e.g., Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366 (1953);
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It is apparent from the legislative history of the Act that Congress in-
tended for state coverage to be as extensive as possible and for the federal
statute to provide relief only in cases in which there is no state remedy."
But, as has been pointed out, it is often unclear how far state coverage
extends, particularly under the maritime-but-local exception created by
the Court. To alleviate the harshness that could have resulted from a
mistake in the choice of forums in difficult borderline cases,2 - the
Court in Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries22 enunciated the
"twilight-zone" doctrine. The effect of Davis was to grant presumptive
validity to both federal and state compensation statutes in cases -involving
waterfront mishaps if a reasonable argument could be made that either
remedy was applicable. Thus the injured harbor worker could elect either
state or federal compensation in "twilight-zone" cases.' However, the
"twilight-zone" doctrine was not considered to apply to injuries to long-
shoremen on piers or docks, and the injured worker could not choose the
federal Act as his remedy.
24
In 1962, the Court went further and judicially deleted from the
Longshoremen's Act the prerequisite that compensation under it is
allowed only in cases in which the state may not provide an award.
Ignoring the express language of the Act, the Court in Calbeck v.
Travelers Insuraiwe Co. 5 stated that
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941); Nicholson v. Calbeck, 385
F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1967); Houser v. O'Leary, 383 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1967).
2An investigation of the legislative intent underlying the statute revealed that
the original version of the bill provided:
This act shall apply to any employment performed on a place within the
admiralty jurisdiction of the United States except- to employment of local
concern and of no direct relation to navigation and commerce; but shall
not apply to employment as master and member of the crew of a vessel.
S. Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1927). The phraseology "local concern"
was objected to by the chairman of the Senate Committe because "to create an
exemption for 'employment of local concern' threatened to perpetuate the very
uncertainties of coverage that Congress wished to avoid." Calbeck v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1962).
"
1Two such borderline cases are Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358
U.S. 272 (1959) and Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
22317 U.S. 249 (1942).
See, e.g., Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272 (1959). The
Court said that as to cases within this "twilight-zone," Davis, in effect, gave "an
injured waterfront employee an election to recover compensation under either the
Longshoremen's Act or the Workmen's Compensation law of the State in which
the injury occurred." Id. at 273.
2'See 2 LARSON, , THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 410 (1952). In-
juries on docks or piers were considered clearly within state jurisdiction and not
borderline cases to which the "twilight-zone" doctrine could apply.
22370 U.S. 114 (1962).
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our conclusion is that Congress invoked its constitutional power so
as to provide compensation for all injuries sustained by employees on
navigable waters whether or not a particular injury might also have
been within the constitutional reach of a state workmen's compensation
law.2 6
The claimants in Calbeck had been injured while working on incomplete
vessels lying in navigable waters, but they were allowed recovery tinder
the Act. Previously, workers injured while engaged in such work were
allowed compensation only under state laws because such employment
was considered clearly maritime but local in nature.2 The result of
Calbeck was to extend the area of overlapping federal and state coverage
and increase the occasions when a claimant had a choice between federal
and state compensation remedies.
Just as the earlier exceptions to Jensen left open the question of how
far seaward state workmen's compensation could extend, Calbeck failed
to answer how far toward land the federal remedy extended. Cases
following Calbeck generally interpreted the Longshoremen's Act to
require that the injury occur on the navigable waters of the United States.
Thus injuries suffered on docks and piers were not generally thought to
give rise to federal compensation.2 8 Then in 1968 the Fourth Circuit
became the first court of appeals to extend coverage of the Longshore-
men's Act to injuries consumated on a pier when it decided Oosting.
The issue confronting the Fourth Circuit was stated by Judge Sobeloff,
the author of the majority opinion in Oosting, to be "whether an injury
on a pier falls within the coverage of the Act."2" In a three-pronged
opinion the majority held that (1) the Longshoremen's Act is status and
not situs oriented and covers all longshoremen working under the same
contract regardless of where the injury occurs; (2) the Admiralty Ex-
tension Act,30 which extends admiralty jurisdiction over torts to cover
20Id. at 117 (emphasis added).2 2The factual situation in Calbeck was the same as that in Grant Porter-Smith
Ship Co. v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469 (1922), in which the maritime-but-local doctrine
was applied.
8 Nicholson v. Calbeck, 385 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Houser v. O'Leary, 383
F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Shea, 382 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1967).
But see Michigan Mutual Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 233 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
" 398 F.2d at 902. See Note, Dockside Injuries Under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 3 GA. L. REv. 622 (1969) (approving
the court's holding); Note, The Ambiguous, Amphibious Employee: The Relation-
ship Between the Longshoremen's Act and State Compensation Legislation, 18
HAsT. L.J. 891 (1967) (disapproving the court's holding).
" 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1964).
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injuries occurring on the land that are caused by a vessel on navigable
waters, impliedly extends coverage of the Longshoremen's Act to the
same degree, and (3) an injury occurring on a pier extending over
navigable waters is an injury occurring "upon navigable waters" and
thus is within the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act.
The majority's first contention was that the Longshoremen's Act,
irrespective of the situs of the injury, was intended by Congress to cover
injuries to longshoremen by virtue of their employment. Judge Sobeloff
found support for this position in the Supreme Court's holding in Calbeck
that "Congress intended the compensation act to have a coverage co-
extensive with the limits of its authority."31  Moreover, interpreting
the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act to extend to the broad juris-
diction of admiralty over workers' contracts would seem to comply with
the Supreme Court's mandate in Reed v. The Yakad3 that the statute
should be liberally construed to avoid harsh and incongruous results. In-
deed, it would seem to be "harsh and incongruous" to permit recovery
to a longshoreman on a ship and to deny it to his fellow worker on a
nearby pier when both were injured by the same crane.33
The majority also relied heavily on the language in Michigan Mutual
Liability Co. v. Arrien4 "that 'upon navigable waters' [as used in the
Longshoremen's Act] is to be equated with 'admiralty jurisdiction.'" 35
But this decision was not based on the theory of the worker's status; on
the contrary, the court found that "upon navigable waters" was im-
pliedly expanded by the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948. 6 It should
also be noted that the Supreme Court in Calbeck implicitly accepted the
validity of applying the test of the situs of the injury to determine
whether an employee is covered by the Longshoremen's Act.ST
The second approach taken by the majority in Oosting was that the
Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, by extending the jurisdiction of
admiralty over torts to include all injuries caused by a vessel that were
consumated on land, also impliedly expanded coverage of the Longshore-
men's Act. But the trial court in Johnson v. Traynor3s had exhaustively
GCalbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 130 (1962).
"373 U.S. 410, 415 (1963).
"398 F.2d at 903.
"233 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). This decision also had permitted recovery
under the Longshoremen's Act for injuries suffered on a pier.
8r Id. at 501.
"Id. at 502.
See Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 115-17, 124-27 (1962).
"243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965).
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studied this possibility and concluded that the legislative history of both
statutes, the express coverage of the Extension Act, and the administrative
interpretations of the compensation statute clearly negate an implied
extension of coverage of the Longshoremen's Act. Moreover, a House
report made in 1958 concluded that longshoremen are protected by "state
safety standards when performing work on docks and in other shore
areas."39 Hence it is not surprising that most courts confronted with
this issue have agreed with the opinion in Johnson that the Extension
Act cannot be construted to extend the coverage of the Longshoremen's
Act.40
In the third prong of his opinion in Oosting, Judge Sobeloff reasoned
that by virtue of D'Aleman v. Pan American Airways41 the scope of the
phrase "upon navigable waters" used in the Longshoremen's Act extends
to injuries occurring above such waters.4 2  D'Aleman, however, in-
volved interpretation of the phrase "on the high seas" used in the Death
on the High Seas Act.43 While the Second Circuit in D'Aleman did
expand the phrase "on the high seas" to cover a cause of action arising
,in a plane flying above the ocean, the value of the case as precedent for
Judge Sobeloff's position is at best dubious.
Chief Judge Haynesworth, dissenting in Oosting, rejected all three
of the majority's arguments. 44  He admitted the "incongruity" of a
remedy that depends on where a worker who frequently passes between
a ship and the dock happens to be when injured, but proposed that the
dock's edge is at least a clear and convenient place to draw a line between
application of state and federal compensation remedies. Even under the
approach of the majority in Oosting, incongruities are easy to anticipate.
For example, a longshoreman can be injured several miles from shore
on an errand for his employer unconnected with maritime work. "If the
line is moved shoreward of the dock's edge, short of inclusion of every
longshoreman wherever he may be and however he may be injured, it is
bound to be vague and fuzzy and a fruitful source of contention and
litigation... .45
" H.R. Rep. No: 2287, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1958).
"oE.g., Houser v. O'Leary, 383 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Atlantic Stevedoring
.Co. v. O'Keefe, 220 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ga. 1963); Revel v. American Export
Lines, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Va. 1958).
"1259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
42398 F.2d at 908.
'846 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1964).
"Id. at 909-14 (dissenting opinion).
"Id. at 912-13 (dissenting opinion).
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Perhaps the most telling point in the dissenting opinion was made in
an analysis of congressional intent in passing the Longshoremen's Act.
Quoted was a Senate report in which it was stated that "injuries occurring
in loading or unloading are not covered unless they occur on the ship or
between the wharf and the ship so as to bring them within the maritime
jurisdiction of the United States." 46
When the case was taken on appeal, the logic of the dissent in Oosting
was accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court in its decision in
Nacirema. Rejecting all three prongs of Judge Sobeloff's opinion, the
Court asserted that
construing the Longshoremen's Act to coincide with the limits of
admiralty jurisdiction-whatever they may be and however they may
change-simply replaces one line with another whose uncertain con-
tours can only perpetuate on the landward side of the Jensen line, the
same confusion which previously existed on the seaward side.47
The decision in Nacirema approving Chief Judge Haynesworth's rationale
is laudable in that it provides a definite line beyond which the federal
compensation remedy will not extend shoreward to overlap state coverage
of longshoremen and harbor workers.
Remaining after Nacirema is concurrent federal and state jurisdiction
over navigable waters in cases in which a worker's injury stems from a
transaction that is maritime but local in nature. It is now desirable to
eliminate this overlap. After all, the exception allowing state coverage to
extend beyond the shoreline to encompass transactions on navigable
waters was justified mainly on the ground that there was no federal remedy
when the maritime-but-local doctrine was created. The federal remedy
under the Longshoremen's Act is clearly available after the Supreme
Court's decision in Calbeck to a longshoreman or harbor worker in-
jured on navigable waters as a result of his employment. The line drawn
in Nacirerna should now be applied by the Court to limit the coverage
of both the state and federal remedies. Under such an application of
Nacireza, the state remedy would be available only for injuries suffered
on shore or on structures that can be considered an extension of the land.
The federal remedy under the Longshoremen's Act would be applied
only to provide compensation for injuries suffered on maritime waters.
"' S. Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1927). See note 20, supra for a
general discussion of the legislative history of the Longshoremen's. Act.
17 396 U.S. at 223. (The three dissenting justices agreed with Judge Sobeloff.)
1970]
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Such a result would provide a definite line to enable lawyers and judges
to determine with certainty whether an injured longshoreman is covered
under the federal or the state act.
GEORGE HACKNEY EATMAN
Attorneys-Admission to the Bar-Consideration of the
Constitutionality of Bar Examiners' Inquiries into Political
Associations and Beliefs
Bar examiners for years have considered the "subversive applicant"
an inherent danger to the legal profession' and have all but avowed a duty
to deny him the privilege to practice.2 Although most, if not all, states
have a requirement of a finding of "good moral character" and some form
of constitutional oath prior to admission,3 some states have made demand-
ing inquiries into the loyalty of applicants in bar-examination character
questionnaires. 4 Bar-admission committees face increasing numbers of
applicants whose interests in law reform, civil rights, and other "causes"
present sharply divergent political views from those of the traditionally
conservative bar.5
IRemarks of Samuel J. Kanner, Chairman of the Florida Board of Bar Ex-
aminers in 54 BRIEF 154-55 (1959) (tracing the downfall of many constitutional
governments to "subversive elements" infiltrating the bar) [hereinafter cited as
Kanner Remarks]; Address of George T. Cronin, Secretary of the National Con-
ference of Bar Examiners in 32 Ba EXAMINER 84-85 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Cronin Address].
'"The right to deny the privilege to practice to such an applicant appears
to be fundamental." Cronin Address at 85.
In this great democracy of ours, we, as bar examiners, are, therefore,
intrusted with what might well prove to be the key to the preservation of
what we know as a "way of life." . . . If we, as bar examiners, can success-
fully eliminate the subversive applicant . . . we will have prevented the in-
fection of the bar. . . . This is our responsibility and task.
Kanner Remarks at 154-55.
'7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 7(b), 12 (1937) ; Brown and Fassett, Loyalty
Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 480 & n.1 (1953) [hereinafter
cited as Brown and Fassett]. See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366
U.S. 36, 40 & n.4 (1961).
'"Twenty-eight states report a character examination procedure that usually
includes a personal appearance." SuRvEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, BAR EXAM-
INATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 257 (1952). See gen-
erally Brown and Fassett at 483-87.
'Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Process of Admission to the Bar,
N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 135, 152 (1969). See generally Larson, The Lawyer as
Conservative, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 183 (1955).
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